ted演讲中英文演讲稿示例

时间：2021-04-09 17:05:30 演讲稿我要投稿

ted演讲中英文演讲稿示例

　　ted演讲中英文演讲稿篇一：TED演讲中英对照1

ted演讲中英文演讲稿示例

　　At every stage of our lives we make decisions that will profoundly influence the lives of the people we're going to become, and then when we become those

　　people, we're not always thrilled with the decisions we made. So young people pay good money to get tattoos removed that teenagers paid good money to get.

　　Middle-aged people rushed to divorce people who young adults rushed to marry. Older adults work hard to lose what middle-aged adults worked hard to gain. On and on and on. The question is, as a psychologist, that fascinates me is, why do we make decisions that our future selves so often regret?

　　在我们生命的每个阶段，我们都会做出一些决定，这些决定会深刻影响未来我们自己的生活，当我们成为未来的自己时，我们并不总是对过去做过的决定感到高兴。所以年轻人花很多钱洗去当还是青少年时花了很多钱做上的纹身。中年人急着跟年轻时迫不及待想结婚的人离婚。老年人很努力的挥霍着作为中年人时不停工作所赚的钱。如此没完没了。作为一个心理学家，让我感兴趣的问题是，为什么我们会做出让自己将来常常后悔的决定？

　　Now, I think one of the reasons -- I'll try to convince you today — is that we have a fundamental misconception about the power of time. Every one of you knows that the rate of change slows over the human lifespan, that your children seem to

　　change by the minute but your parents seem to change by the year. But what is the name of this magical point in life where change suddenly goes from a gallop to a crawl? Is it teenage years? Is it middle age? Is it old age? The answer, it turns out, for most people, is now, wherever now happens to be. What I want to convince you today is that all of us are walking around with an illusion, an illusion that history,

　　our personal history, has just come to an end, that we have just recently become the people that we were always meant to be and will be for the rest of our lives. 我认为其中一个原因——而我今天想说服你们的——就是我们对时间的力量有个基本的错误概念。你们每个人都知道变化的速度随着人的年龄增长不断放慢，孩子们好像每分钟都有变化，而父母们的变化则要慢得多。那么生命中这个让变化突然间从飞速变得缓慢的神奇转折点应该叫什么呢？是青少年时期吗？是中年时期吗？是老年阶段吗？其实对大多数人来说，答案是，现在，无论现在发生在什么。今天我想让大家明白的是，我们所有人都在围绕着一种错觉生活，这种错觉就是，我们每个人的过去，都已经结束了，我们已经成为了我们应该成为的那种人，在余下的生命中也都会如此。

　　Let me give you some data to back up that claim. So here's a study of change in people's personal values over time. Here's three values. Everybody here holds all of them, but you probably know that as you grow, as you age, the balance of these values shifts. So how does it do so? Well, we asked thousands of people. We asked half of them to predict for us how much their values would change in the next 10 years, and the others to tell us how much their values had changed in the last 10 years. And this enabled us to do a really interesting kind of analysis, because it allowed us to compare the predictions of people, say, 18 years old, to the reports of people who were 28, and to do that kind of analysis throughout the lifespan.

　　我想给你们展示一些数据来支持这个观点。这是一项关于人们的个人价值观随时间变化的研究。这里有3种价值观。每个人的生活都与这三个价值观相关，但是你们可能知道，随着你们慢慢长大，变老，这三个价值观的平衡点会不断变化。到底是怎么回事呢？我们询问了

　　数千人。我们让他们当中一半的人预测了一下在未来10年中，他们的价值观会发生多大的改变，让另一半人告诉我们在过去的10年中，他们的价值观发生了多大的变化。这项调查可以让我们做一个很有趣的分析，因为它可以让我们将大约18岁左右的人的预测同大约28岁左右的人的答案相比较，这项分析可以贯穿人的一生。

　　Here's what we found. First of all, you are right, change does slow down as we age, but second, you're wrong, because it doesn't slow nearly as much as we think. At every age, from 18 to 68 in our data set, people vastly underestimated how much change they would experience over the next 10 years. We call this the "end of history" illusion. To give you an idea of the magnitude of this effect, you can connect these two lines, and what you see here is that 18-year-olds anticipate changing only as much as 50-year-olds actually do.

　　这是我们的发现。首先，你们是对的，随着我们年龄的增长，变化会减缓。第二，你们错了，因为这种变化并不像我们想象的那么慢。在我们的数据库从18岁到68岁的每一个年龄段中，人们大大的低估了在未来的10年他们会经历多少变化。我们把这叫做“历史终止”错觉。为了让你们了解这种影响有多大，你们可以把这两条线连接起来，你们现在看到的是18岁的人群预期的改变仅仅和50岁的人群实际经历的一样。

　　Now it's not just values. It's all sorts of other things. For example, personality. Many of you know that psychologists now claim that there are five fundamental

　　dimensions of personality: neuroticism, openness to experience, agreeableness, extraversion, and conscientiousness. Again, we asked people how much they

　　expected to change over the next 10 years, and also how much they had changed

　　over the last 10 years, and what we found, well, you're going to get used to seeing this diagram over and over, because once again the rate of change does slow as we age, but at every age, people underestimate how much their personalities will change in the next decade.

　　现在不仅仅是价值观了。其他的方面都也有变化。比如说，人格。你们当中的很多人知道现在心理学家们认为人格可以分为五个基本维度：神经质性，经验汲取度，协调性，外向性和道德感。回到原来的话题，我们问人们他们期待未来的10年中自己会有多大的变化，以及他们在过去的10年中发生了多少变化，我们发现了，你们会习惯不断地看到这个图表，因为又一次，变化速率随着我们的年龄增长减慢了。但是在每一个年龄阶段，人们都低估了在未来的十年中他们的人格会发生多大的改变。

　　And it isn't just ephemeral things like values and personality. You can ask people about their likes and dislikes, their basic preferences. For example, name your best friend, your favorite kind of vacation, what's your favorite hobby, what's your

　　favorite kind of music. People can name these things. We ask half of them to tell us, "Do you think that that will change over the next 10 years?" and half of them to tell us, "Did that change over the last 10 years?" And what we find, well, you've seen it twice now, and here it is again: people predict that the friend they have now is the friend they'll have in 10 years, the vacation they most enjoy now is the one they'll enjoy in 10 years, and yet, people who are 10 years older all say, "Eh, you know, that's really changed."

　　而且不光是像价值观和人格这样的临时性的`特质。你们可以问问人们关于他们喜好和厌恶的事，他们基本的偏好。比如说，说出你最好朋友的名字，你最喜欢什么样的假期，你最大的爱好是什么，你最喜欢什么样的音乐。人们可以说出这些事情。我们让他们当中的一半人告诉我们，“你认为这在未来10年内会改变吗？”让另一半告诉我们，“这个在过去十年内变化了吗？”我们的发现是，嗯，这个图你们已经看过2次了，再展示一次：人们推测他们现在的朋友在未来10年中还会是他们的朋友，他们喜欢的度假之地在未来10年内还会是他们喜欢的地方，然而，年长10岁的人都会说：“嗯，你知道，这确实不一样了。” Does any of this matter? Is this just a form of mis-prediction that doesn't have consequences? No, it matters quite a bit, and I'll give you an example of why. It bedevils our decision-making in important ways. Bring to mind right now for

　　yourself your favorite musician today and your favorite musician 10 years ago. I put mine up on the screen to help you along. Now we asked people to predict for us, to tell us how much money they would pay right now to see their current favorite musician perform in concert 10 years from now, and on average, people said they would pay 129 dollars for that ticket. And yet, when we asked them how much they would pay to see the person who was their favorite 10 years ago perform today, they say only 80 dollars. Now, in a perfectly rational world, these should be the same number, but we overpay for the opportunity to indulge our current preferences because we overestimate their stability.

　　这有什么关系吗？这只是一种并不会有什么后果的错误的预测吗？不，这有很大的关系，我会举例告诉你们为什么。它在很多重要的方面困扰着我们做决定。现在想想你们此时此刻最

　　ted演讲中英文演讲稿篇二：李世默TED演讲稿(中英文)

　　李世默TED：

　　中国崛起与“元叙事”的终结

　　Good morning. My name is Eric Li, and I was born here. But no, I wasn’t born there. This was where I was born: Shanghai, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire along with my first cries. When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained all I ever needed to know that humanity. It went like this. All human societies develop in linear progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we end up? Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language, nationality, will arrive at this final stage of political and social development. The entire world’s peoples will be unified in this paradise on earth and live happily ever after. But before we get there, we’re engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of capitalism, and the good shall triumph. That, of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl Marx. And the Chinese bought it. We were taught that grand story day in and day out. It became part of us, and we believed in it. The story was a bestseller. About on third of the entire world’s population lived under that meta narrative. Then, the world changed overnight. As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my youth, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie. Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened. As if one big story wasn’t enough, I was told another one. This one was just as grand. It also claims that all human societies develop in a linear progression towards a singular end. This one went as follows. All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups are the basic units to modern societies in which atomized individuals are the sovereign units, and all these individuals are, by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote. Because they all rational, once given the vote, they produce good government and live happily ever after. Paradise on earth, again. Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries

　　and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich. But before we get there, we’re engaged in a struggle between good and evil. The good belongs to those who are democracies and are charged with a mission of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those who do not hold elections. Now. This story also became a bestseller. According to the Freedom House, the number of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. In the last 20years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus: multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on them is the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world. Those who buy the prospectus are destined for success. Those who do not are doomed to fail. But this time, the Chinese didn’t buy it. Fool me once… The rest is history. In just 3p years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy. Six hundred fifty million people were lifted out of poverty. Eighty percent of the entire world’s poverty alleviation during that period happened in China. In other words, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without voting. See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps. Meat was rationed to a few hundred grams per person per month at one point. Needless to say, I ate my grandmother’s portions. So I asked myself, what’s wrong with this picture? Here I am in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bounds. Entrepreneurs are starting companies every day. Middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in human history. Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening. So I went and did the only thing I could. I studied it. Yes, China is a one-party state run by the Chinese Communist Party, the Party, and they don’t hold elections. There assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time. Such a system is operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate. Well, the assumptions are wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China’s one-party system. Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is inherently incapable of self-correction. It won’t last long because it cannot adapt. Now here are the facts. In 64 years of running the largest country in the world, the range of the party’s policies

　　has been wider than any other country in recent memory, from radical land collectivization to the Great Leap Forward, then privatization of farmland, then the Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping’s market reform, then successor Jiang Zemin took the giant political step of opening up party membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao’s rule. So the party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions. Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions. For example, term limits. Political leaders used to retain their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes. So the party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70. One thing we often hear is political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms and China is in dire need of political reform. But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. See, some have decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform. The truth is, political reforms have never stopped. Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago, every aspect of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most local level to the highest center, are uecognizable today. Now such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind. Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world’s leading expert in political reform. The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power gets concentrated in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow. Indeed, corruption is a big problem, but let’s first look at the larger context. Now, this maybe be counterintuitive to you. The party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today. China’s highest ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members. In the most recent one, only five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called Princelings. The other 20, including the President and the Premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the percentage of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller. The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to the top. Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you’ll find the Party

　　being near the top in upward mobility. The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? New we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to Westerners: the Party’s Organization Department. The Department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations. It operates a rotation pyramid made up of there components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like a university or a community program. The form separate yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called Keyuan Then they could get promoted through four increasingly elite ranks: fuke, ke, fuchu, and chu. Now these are not moves from karate kids, okay? It’s serious business. The range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a company. Once a year, the department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates. They vet their personal conduct. They conduct public opinion surveys. Then they promote the winners. Throughout their careers, these cadres can move through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the food ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju and ju, levels. There, they enter high, officialdom. By that point, a typical assignment will be to manage a district with population in the millions or a company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. Just to show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900000 fuke and ke levels, 600000 fuchu and chu levels, and only 40000 fuju and ju levels. After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the Central Committee. The process takes two to three decades. Does patronage play a role? Yes of course. But merit remains the fundamental driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernizes version of China’s centuries-old mandarin system. China’s new President Xi Jinping is son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job. Even for him, the career took 30 years. He started as a village manager, and by the time he entered the Politburo, he had managed areas with total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars. Now, please don’t get

　　me wrong, okay? This is not a putdown of anyone. It’s just a statement of fact. George W. Bush, remember him? This is not a putdown. Before becoming Governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for President, could not make even a small county manager in China’s system. Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest. Well, apparently he hadn’t heard of the Organization Department. Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of political legitimacy. I was asked once, “The Party wasn’t voted in by election. Where is the source of Legitimacy?” I said, “How about competency?”: We all know the facts. In 1949, when the Party took power, China was mired in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 42 years old. Today, it’s the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity. Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes, and here are the numbers in recent years. Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent. Those who think they’re better off than five years ago, 70%. Those who expects the future to be better, a whopping 82 percent. Financial Times polls global youth attitudes and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week. Ninety-three-percent of China’s GenerationY are optimistic about their country’s future. Now, if this is not legitimacy, I’m not sure what is. In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from dismal performance. I don’t need to elaborate for this audience how dysfunctional it is from Washington to European capitals. With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have adopted electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife. Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a few months and stay there and get worse until the next election. Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret. At this rate, I’m afraid it is democracy, not China’s one-party system, that is in danger of losing legitimacy. Now, I don’t want to create the misimpression that China’s hunky-dory on the way to some kind of superpowerdom. The country faces enormous challenges. Social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this are mine-boggling. Pollution is one. Food safety. Population issues. On the political front, the worst problem is

　　ted演讲中英文演讲稿篇三：杨澜TED演讲：重塑中国的年轻一代(中英文对照)

　　杨澜TED演讲：重塑中国的年轻一代（中英文对照）

　　The night before I was heading for Scotland, I was invited to host the final of “China’s Got Talent” show in Shanghai with the 80,000 live audience in the stadium. Guess who was the performing guest? Susan Boyle. And I told her, “I’m going to Scotland the next day.” She sang beautifully, and she even managed to say a few words in Chinese. [Chinese] So it’s not like “hello” or “thank you,” that ordinary stuff. It means “green onion for free.” Why did she say that? Because it was a line from our Chinese parallel Susan Boyle — a 50-some year-old woman, a vegetable vendor in Shanghai, who loves singing Western opera, but she didn’t understand any English or French or Italian, so she managed to fill in the lyrics with vegetable names in Chinese. (Laughter) And the last sentence of Nessun Dorma that she was singing in the stadium was “green onion for free.” So [as] Susan Boyle was saying that, 80,000 live audience sang together. That was hilarious.

　　来苏格兰（做TED讲演）的前夜，我被邀请去上海做”中国达人秀“决赛的评委。在装有八万现场观众的演播厅里，在台上的表演嘉宾居然是（来自苏格兰的，因参加英国达人秀走红的）苏珊大妈（Susan Boyle)。我告诉她，“我明天就要启程去苏格兰。” 她唱得很动听，还对观众说了几句中文，她并没有说简单的”你好“或者”谢谢“，她说的是——“送你葱”（Song Ni Cong)。为什么？这句话其实来源于中国版的“苏珊大妈”——一位五十岁的以卖菜为生，却对西方歌剧有出奇爱好的上海中年妇女（蔡洪平）。这位中国的苏珊大妈并不懂英文，法语或意大利文，所以她将歌剧中的词汇都换做中文中的蔬菜名，并且演唱出来。在她口中，歌剧《图兰朵》的最后一句便是“Song Ni Cong”。当真正的英国苏珊大妈唱出这一句“中文的”《图兰朵》时，全场的八万观众也一起高声歌唱，场面的确有些滑稽（hilarious)。

　　So I guess both Susan Boyle and this vegetable vendor in Shanghai belonged to otherness. They were the least expected to be successful in the business called entertainment, yet their courage and talent brought them through. And a show and a platform gave them the stage to realize their dreams. Well, being different is not that difficult. We are all different from different perspectives. But I think being different is good, because you present a different point of view. You may have the chance to make a difference.

　　我想Susan Boyle和这位上海的买菜农妇的确属于人群中的少数。她们是最不可能在演艺界成功的，而她们的勇气和才华让她们成功了，这个节目和舞台给予了她们一个实现个人梦想的机会。这样看来，与众不同好像没有那么难。从不同的方面审视，我们每个人都是不同的。但是我想，与众不同是一件好事，因为你代表了不一样的观点，你拥有了做改变的机会。 My generation has been very fortunate to witness and participate in the historic transformation of China that has made so many changes in the past 20, 30 years. I

　　remember that in the year of 1990, when I was graduating from college, I was applying for a job in the sales department of the first five-star hotel in Beijing, Great Wall Sheraton — it’s still there. So after being interrogated by this Japanese manager for a half an hour, he finally said, “So, Miss Yang, do you have any questions to ask me?” I summoned my courage and poise and said, “Yes, but could you let me know, what actually do you sell?” I

　　didn’t have a clue what a sales department was about in a five-star hotel. That was the first day I set my foot in a five-star hotel.

　　我这一代中国人很幸运的目睹并且参与了中国在过去二三十年中经历的巨变。我记得1990年，当我刚大学毕业时，我申请了当时北京的第一家五星级酒店——长城喜来登酒店的销售部门的工作。这家酒店现在仍在北京。当我被一位日本籍经理面试了一个半小时之后，他问到，“杨小姐，你有什么想问我的吗？”，我屏住呼吸，问道“是的，你能告诉我，具体我需要销售些什么吗？” 当时的我，对五星级酒店的销售部门没有任何概念，事实上，那是我第一次进到一家五星级酒店。

　　Around the same time, I was going through an audition — the first ever open audition by national television in China — with another thousand college girls. The producer told us they were looking for some sweet, innocent and beautiful fresh face. So when it was my turn, I stood up and said, “Why [do] women’s personalities on television always have to be beautiful, sweet, innocent and, you know, supportive? Why can’t they have their own ideas and their own voice?” I thought I kind of offended them. But actually, they were impressed by my words. And so I was in the second round of competition, and then the third and the fourth. After seven rounds of competition, I was the last one to survive it. So I was on a national television prime-time show. And believe it or not, that was the first show on Chinese television that allowed its hosts to speak out of their own minds without reading an approved script. (Applause) And my weekly audience at that time was between 200 to 300 million people.

　　我当时也在参加另一场“面试”，中国国家电视台的首次公开试镜，与我一起参与选拔的还有另外1000名大学女毕业生。节目制作人说，他们希望找到一位甜美，无辜（LOL），漂亮的新鲜面孔。轮到我的时候，我问道“为什么在电视屏幕上，女性总应该表现出甜美漂亮，甚至是服从性的一面？为什么她们不能有她们自己的想法和声音？“我觉得我的问题甚至有点冒犯到了他。但实际上，他们对我的表现印象深刻。我进入了第二轮选拔，第三轮，第四轮，直至最后的第七场选拔，我是唯一一个走到最后的试镜者。我从此走上了国家电视台黄金时段的荧幕。你可能不相信，但在当时，我所主持的电视节目是中国第一个，不让主持人念已经审核过的稿件的节目（掌声）。我每周需要面对两亿到三亿左右的电视观众。

　　Well after a few years, I decided to go to the U.S. and Columbia University to pursue my postgraduate studies, and then started my own media company, which was unthought of during the years that I started my career. So we do a lot of things. I’ve interviewed more than a thousand people in the past. And sometimes I have young people approaching me say, “Lan, you changed my life,” and I feel proud of that. But then we are also so fortunate to witness the transformation of the whole country. I was in Beijing’s bidding for the

　　Olympic Games. I was representing the Shanghai Expo. I saw China embracing the world and vice versa. But then sometimes I’m thinking, what are today’s young generation up to? How are they different, and what are the differences they are going to make to shape the future of China, or at large, the world?

　　几年以后，我决定来美国哥伦比亚大学继续深造，之后也开始运营自己的媒体公司，这也是我在职业生涯初始时所没有预料到的。我的公司做很多不同的业务，在过去这些年里，我访谈过一千多人。经常有年轻人对我说，“杨澜，你改变了我的人生”，我对此感到非常自豪。我也幸运的目睹了整个国家的转变：我参与了北京申奥和上海世博会。我看到中国在拥抱这个世界，而世界也进一步的接受中国。但有时我也在想，今天的年轻人的生活是什么样的？他们（与我们相比）有什么不同？他们将带给中国，甚至整个世界的未来一些怎样的变化？ So today I want to talk about young people through the platform of social media. First of all, who are they? [What] do they look like? Well this is a girl called Guo Meimei — 20 years old, beautiful. She showed off her expensive bags, clothes and car on her microblog, which is the Chinese version of Twitter. And she claimed to be the general manager of Red Cross at the Chamber of Commerce. She didn’t realize that she stepped on a sensitive nerve and aroused national questioning, almost a turmoil, against the credibility of Red Cross. The controversy was so heated that the Red Cross had to open a press conference to clarify it, and the investigation is going on.

　　So far, as of today, we know that she herself made up that title — probably because she feels proud to be associated with charity. All those expensive items were given to her as gifts by her boyfriend, who used to be a board member in a subdivision of Red Cross at Chamber of Commerce. It’s very complicated to explain. But anyway, the public still doesn’t buy it. It is still boiling. It shows us a general mistrust of government or

　　government-backed institutions, which lacked transparency in the past. And also it showed us the power and the impact of social media as microblog.

　　我想通过社交媒体来谈一谈中国的年轻人们。首先，他们是谁，他们是什么样子？这是一位叫郭美美的女孩儿，20岁，年轻漂亮。她在中国版的Twitter上——新浪微博上，炫耀她所拥有的奢侈品，衣服，包和车。她甚至宣称她是中国红十字会的工作人员。她没有意识到她的行为触及了中国民众极为敏感的神经，这引发了一场全民大讨论，民众开始质疑红十字会的公信力。中国红十字会为了平息这场争议甚至举办了一场记者会来澄清，直至今日，对于”郭美美事件“的调查仍在继续，但我们所知道的事实是，她谎报了她的头衔，可能是因为她的虚荣心，希望把自己和慈善机构联系起来。所有那些奢侈品都是她的男朋友给她买的，而那位”男朋友“的确曾经是红十字会的工作人员。这解释起来很复杂，总之，公众对他们的解释仍然不满意，这仍然是在风口浪尖的一件事。这件事体现出（中国社会）对长期不透明的政府机关的不信任，同时也表现出社交媒体（微博）巨大的社会影响力。

　　Microblog boomed in the year of 2010, with visitors doubled and time spent on it tripled. Sina.com, a major news portal, alone has more than 140 million microbloggers. On

　　Tencent, 200 million. The most popular blogger — it’s not me — it’s a movie star, and she has more than 9.5 million followers, or fans. About 80 percent of those microbloggers are young people, under 30 years old. And because, as you know, the traditional media is still heavily controlled by the government, social media offers an opening to let the steam out a little bit. But because you don’t have many other openings, the heat coming out of this opening is sometimes very strong, active and even violent.

　　微博在2010年得到了爆炸性的增长，微博的访问用户增长了一倍，用户的访问时间是09年的三倍。新浪（Sina.com)，一个最主要的微博平台，拥有1.4亿的微博用户，而腾讯拥有两亿用户。（在中国）最有名的微博主——不是我——是一位电影明星，她拥有近九百五十万”粉丝“。接近80％的微博用户是年轻人，三十岁以下。因为传统媒体还在政府的强力控制之下，社交媒体提供了一个开放的平台进行了一些（民众观点的）分流。因为这样分流的渠道并不多，从这个平台上爆发出的能量往往非常强烈，有时候甚至过于强烈。

　　So through microblogging, we are able to understand Chinese youth even better. So how are they different? First of all, most of them were born in the 80s and 90s, under the one-child policy. And because of selected abortion by families who favored boys to girls, now we have ended up with 30 million more young men than women. That could pose a potential danger to the society, but who knows; we’re in a globalized world, so they can look for girlfriends from other countries. Most of them have fairly good education. The illiteracy rate in China among this generation is under one percent. In cities, 80 percent of kids go to college. But they are facing an aging China with a population above 65 years old coming up with seven-point-some percent this year, and about to be 15 percent by the year of 2030. And you know we have the tradition that younger generations support the elders financially, and taking care of them when they’re sick. So it means young couples will have to support four parents who have a life expectancy of 73 years old.

　　通过微博，我们可以更好的了解到中国的年轻一代。首先，他们中的大多数都出生在八零九零年代，在独生子女的生育政策的大背景下长大。因为偏好男孩的家庭会选择性的堕胎，现在（中国）的年轻男性的数量多过年轻女性三千万，这可能带来社会的不稳定（危险），但是我们知道，在这个全球化的社会中，他们可能可以去其他国家找女朋友。大多数人都拥有良好的教育。这一代中国人中的文盲率已经低于1％。在城市中，80％的孩子可以上大学，但他们将要面对的是一个，有接近7％的人口都是老年人的社会，这个数字会在2030年会增长到2030年。在这个国家，传统是让年轻人来从经济上和医疗上来支持老年人，这意味着，一对年轻的夫妻将需要支持四个平均年龄是73岁的老人。

　　So making a living is not that easy for young people. College graduates are not in short supply. In urban areas, college graduates find the starting salary is about 400 U.S. dollars a month, while the average rent is above $500. So what do they do? They have to share space — squeezed in very limited space to save money — and they call themselves “tribe of ants.” And for those who are ready to get married and buy their apartment, they figured out they have to work for 30 to 40 years to afford their first apartment. That ratio in America would only cost a couple five years to earn, but in China it’s 30 to 40 years with the skyrocketing real estate price.

　　所以对于年轻人而言，生活并不是容易。本科毕业生也不在是紧缺资源。在城市中，本科生的月起薪通常是400美元（2500人民币），而公寓的平均月租金却是500美元。所以他们的解决方式是合租——挤在有限的空间中以节省开支，他们叫自己”蚁族。“ 对于那些准备好结婚并希望购买一套公寓的中国年轻夫妇而言，他们发现他们必须要不间断的工作30到40年才可以负(转载于: :ted演讲中英文演讲稿)担得起一套公寓。对于同样的美国年轻夫妇而言，他们只需要五年时间。

　　Among the 200 million migrant workers, 60 percent of them are young people. They find themselves sort of sandwiched between the urban areas and the rural areas. Most of them don’t want to go back to the countryside, but they don’t have the sense of belonging. They work for longer hours with less income, less social welfare. And they’re more vulnerable to job losses, subject to inflation, tightening loans from banks, appreciation of the renminbi, or decline of demand from Europe or America for the products they produce. Last year, though, an appalling incident in a southern OEM manufacturing compound in China: 13 young workers in their late teens and early 20s committed suicide, just one by one like causing a contagious disease. But they died because of all different personal reasons. But this whole incident aroused a huge outcry from society about the isolation, both physical and mental, of these migrant workers.

　　在近两亿的涌入城市的农民工中，他们中的60％都是年轻人。他们发现自己被夹在了城市和农村中，大多数人不愿意回到农村，但他们在城市也找不到归属感。他们工作更长的时间却获得更少的薪水和社会福利。他们也更容易面临失业，受到通货膨胀，银行利率，人民币升值的影响，甚至美国和欧盟对于中国制造产品的抵制也会影响到他们。去年，在中国南方的一个制造工厂里，有十三位年轻的工人选择了结束自己的生命，一个接一个，像一场传染病。他们轻生的原因各有不同，但整个事件提醒了中国社会和政府，需要更多的关注这些在精神上和生理上都与外界脱节的年轻农民工人。

　　For those who do return back to the countryside, they find themselves very welcome locally, because with the knowledge, skills and networks they have learned in the cities, with the assistance of the Internet, they’re able to create more jobs, upgrade local agriculture and create new business in the less developed market. So for the past few years, the coastal areas, they found themselves in a shortage of labor.

　　对于那些回到农村的年轻人，他们所经历的城市生活，所学到的知识，技巧和建立的社会网络，让他们通常更受欢迎。特别是在互联网的帮助下，他们更有可能获得工作，提升农村的农业水平和发展新的商业机会。在过去的一些年中，一些沿海的城镇甚至出现了劳动力短缺。 These diagrams show a more general social background. The first one is the Engels

　　coefficient, which explains that the cost of daily necessities has dropped its percentage all through the past decade, in terms of family income, to about 37-some percent. But then in the last two years, it goes up again to 39 percent, indicating a rising living cost. The Gini coefficient has already passed the dangerous line of 0.4. Now it’s 0.5 — even worse than that in America — showing us the income inequality. And so you see this whole society getting frustrated about losing some of its mobility. And also, the bitterness and even resentment towards the rich and the powerful is quite widespread. So any accusations of corruption or backdoor dealings between authorities or business would arouse a social outcry or even uest.

　　这些图片展现出整体的社会背景。第一张图片是恩格斯系数（食品支出占总消费支出的比例），可以看到在过去的十年中，食物和生活必需品在家庭消费中的比例有所下降（37％），然后在过去的两年中，这项指数上升到39％，说明近两年中生活成本的攀升。基尼系数早

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